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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IN
ILLINOIS: THE FIRST DISTRICT EXPANDS ITS
SCOPE BEYOND DEFENDANTS IN THE
BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING INFORMATION
The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for
2
negligent misrepresentation' in Rozny v. Marnu1
in 1969. Until recently, Illinois courts generally permitted plaintiffs to recover only
against defendants who were in the business of supplying information. 3 However, in Board of Education of Chicago v. A, C, & S, Inc.,
1. Negligent misrepresentation allows a plaintiff to recover economic loss resulting from his reliance on a false statement made by a defendant who acted unreasonably in not ascertaining the truth. Comment, Negligent Misrepresentationin Missouri: Tooling Up for the Tort of the Eighties, 50 Mo. L. REV. 877 (1985). A
representation made with an honest belief in its truth may still be negligent if the
person making the representation failed to use reasonable care in ascertaining the
facts, or in presenting his ability to act with the skill or competence required in a
particular trade or business. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 745
(5th ed. 1984). A negligent misrepresentation can be a representation that the
speaker believes to be true but is actually false because of the speaker's negligent
inaccuracy concerning a material fact. Lehmann v. Arnold, 137 Ill. App. 3d 412, 420,
484 N.E.2d 473, 479 (1985).
2. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
3. Century Universal Enter., Inc. v. Triana Dev. Corp., 158 Ill. App. 3d 182, 206,
510 N.E.2d 1260, 1274 (1987) (defendants merely in business of managing venture not
liable for negligent misrepresentation); Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate Inc.,
156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164, 510 N.E.2d 409, 415 (1986) (held realtors were in business of
supplying information), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 129 (Ill. 1987); Perschall v. Raney,
137 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983-84, 484 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (1985) (ruled termite inspector
was in business of supplying information); Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 117 Il.
App. 3d 304, 308, 453 N.E.2d 8, 11 (1983) (no cause of action against manufacturer
and seller of roof materials because not in business of supplying information); Black,
Jackson and Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 109 Ill.
App. 3d 132, 136, 440 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1982) (no cause of action against seller of
computer and software package who were not in business of supplying information);
See also POLELLE & OTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW 265-66 (1985).
Other decisions, however, have not limited negligent misrepresentation to defendants in the business of supplying information. Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C,
& S, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 737, 756, 525 N.E.2d 950, 962 (1988) (cause of action existed against manufacturers, suppliers and installers of asbestos-containirig material);
Rotello v. Scott, 95 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252, 419 N.E.2d 1233, 1235 (1981) (sellers of
property held liable for falsely representing existence of sewer hook-up); Lyons v.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 22:753

the Illinois Appellate Court squarely held that anyone who negligently supplies information to others in a transaction in which he
has a pecuniary interest could be liable for economic damages under
4
a theory of negligent misrepresentation.
In A, C, & S, several school districts were under a legal obligation to remove asbestos-containing material from their school buildings. They therefore brought suit to recover economic damages from
the various suppliers of the asbestos-containing products, alleging
among other things, strict liability, negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation. 5
'The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation
claim, stating that "[tihe tort of negligent misrepresentation does
not require that defendants be in the business of supplying information."" In other words, in a negligent misrepresentation claim, the
nature of the defendant's business is irrelevant so long as he supplied the information in connection with a transaction in which he
had a pecuniary interest.
'The A, C, & S decision is a step in the right direction. Previous
Illinois Appellate Court decisions, in limiting the scope of negligent
misrepresentation, have misinterpreted the Illinois Supreme Court's
treatment of the tort, ignored the proper interpretation of Section
552 of the Second Restatement, and ignored the modern trend established by other states dealing with negligent misrepresentation.
Other Illinois appellate courts should follow the A, C, & S court's
broad application of negligent misrepresentation, which permits the
cappe of action against a wider variety of defendants.
HISTORY OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IN ILLINOIS

The Illinois Appellate Court began to recognize the tort of negChrist-Episcopal Church, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 257, 261, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625-26 (1979)
(church liable for negligently representing that building connected to city's sanitary
sewerage system); McAfee v. Rockford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 521,
526, 352 N.E.2d 50, 55 (1976) (cause of action permitted against potential employer
who induced plaintiff to quit job).
4. Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A,C, & S, Inc., 171 Il. App. 3d 737, 756, 525
N.E.2d 950, 954 (1988).
5. A,C, & S, 171 Ill.
App. 3d at 756, 525 N.E.2d at 954. The plaintiffs also made
claims for restitution, a private right of action under the Asbestos Abatement Act,
consumer fraud, breach of warranty, and concert of action. Id.
6. Id. at 744, 525 N.E.2d at 954. The court's secondary argument was that the
plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged actual damages (personal injury), rather than
just economic damages. Id. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had
incorrectly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under other tort theories (strict liability
and negligence) because the existence of asbestos materials in the schools was a
threat to the health and welfare of the students. Id. at 748, 525 N.E.2d at 956.
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ligent misrepresentation in the mid-1960s. 7 Several courts found the
tort in Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts, which at that time
stated that "one who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if . . . he fails to exercise care and
competence .... 8
A.

Rozny v. Marnul

The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the tort of negligent
misrepresentation in Rozny v. Marnul, holding a surveyor liable for
negligently supplying an incorrect survey.9 The defendant had prepared the survey for a company building a real estate development.'" The plaintiffs eventually acquired the defendant's survey
from a bank when it assumed the builder's mortgage." Relying on
the survey, the plaintiff extended a driveway and built a garage that
encroached slightly on the adjacent lot.'2
In considering the plaintiff's claim against the surveyor for tortious misrepresentation, the Illinois Supreme Court first abolished
the traditional requirement that a plaintiff be in privity of contract
with the defendant.' s The Rozny court determined that notwith7. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill. App. 2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612
(1966); Guaranty Bank and Trust Company v. Reyna, 51 Ill.
App. 2d 412, 201 N.E.2d
144 (1964).
8. The full text of original Section 552 read as follows:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability, for
harm caused to them by their representation if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or in of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was
intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical
therewith.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 552 (1938).
9. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 68, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
10. Id. at 57, 250 N.E.2d at 658. The property was purchased by a builder who
subsequently erected a house. Id. at 57, 250 N.E.2d at 658. A bank received the inaccurate survey when the builder was granted a loan placing a mortgage on the property. Id. The defendant claimed that he issued a corrected survey; there was no evidence, however, that the bank or builder ever received it. Id.
11. Id. at 58, 250 N.E.2d at 658. The defendant's erroneous survey stated that
"this plat of survey carries our absolute guarantee for accuracy, and is issued subject
to faithful carrying out of the above and foregoing instructions and conditions before
any liability will be assumed on part of the Jens K. Doe survey service." Id. at 58-59,
250 N.E.2d 658-59.
12. Id. at 58, 250 N.E.2d at 658 (west edge of garage encroached from two (2)
inches to just over a foot onto adjacent lot).
13. Id. at 66, 250 N.E.2d at 662; See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
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standing the lack of privity, it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a third party would rely on the survey in financing and
purchasing the property." The supreme court therefore concluded
that the defendant was liable for negligently representing that their
survey was accurate. 15 Thus, Rozny established that a person who
carelessly makes representations, such as to the accuracy of a survey, may be liable if those representations are false. The Rozny
court did not, however, say whether liability for negligent misrepresentation was limited to defendants who produce surveys or offer
other informational services.
After Rozny, the Illinois Appellate Court continued to recognize
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation in cases involving a
variety of defendants: private sellers of real property, real estate
16
brokers, a church, stock brokers, and a prospective employer. It
thus appeared that the tort of negligent misrepresentation had a
broad reach and was not limited to a narrow category of defendants.
B.

The Moorman Manufacturing Dicta

In 1982, the Illinois Supreme Court made a passing reference to
its Rozny decision and greatly affected the development of negligent
misrepresentation in Illinois. In Moorman Manufacturing Company
v. National Tank Company,17 a buyer brought an action against the
manufacturer of a grain tank for economic damages suffered when
the tank developed a crack. The supreme court held that the plain255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In a famous opinion, Justice Cardozo ruled that an
accountant was not liable to a lender for negligently preparing a certified audit of a
borrower. Ultramares,255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447. Although the lender relied on
the audit in extending the borrower credit, Cardozo concluded that the lender did not
have a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against the accountant because
of the absence of a contractual relationship between the two parties. Id. Thus, Ultrarnaresestablished the rule that a plaintiff has to be in privity of contract with a
provider of information in order to sue him for negligent misrepresentation. Id.;
Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 65; 250 N.E.2d at 662. The Rozny court determined that privity
was not required in this case because the defendant surveyor included an absolute
guarantee of accuracy on the inaccurate survey. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 66, 250 N.E.2d at
662.
14. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 66, 250 N.E.2d at 662.
15. Id. at 68, 250 N.E.2d at 663. The court ruled that "the situation is not one
fraught with such an overwhelming potential liability as to dictate a contrary result,
for the class of persons who might foreseeably use this plat is rather narrowly limited,
if not exclusively so, to those who deal with the surveyed property as purchasers or
lenders." Id. at 66, 250 N.E.2d at 662.
16. Rotello v. Scott, 95 Il1. App. 3d 248, 419 N.E.2d 1233 (1981) (seller of real
property); Duhl v. Nash Realty Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 429 N.E.2d 1267 (1981)
(real estate broker); Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 Il. App. 3d 257, 389
N.E.2d 623 (1979); Penrod v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 68 Ill. App. 3d
75, 385 N.E.2d 376 (1979) (stockbrokers); McAfee v. Rockford Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 521, 352 N.E.2d 50 (1976) (prospective employer).
17. 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
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tiffs could not recover solely economic losses under theories of strict
liability, negligent design, or innocent misrepresentation. 8 The
Moorman court held the plaintiffs' economic losses could be recovered under the Uniform Commercial Code"9 rather that under those
tort theories. In dicta citing Rozny, however, the Moorman court indicated that a plaintiff could recover economic loss in a negligent
misrepresentation cause of action ". . . where one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions makes negligent representations."2
The Illinois appellate court interpreted the Moorman court's citation of Rozny as limiting the application of negligent misrepresentation to those defendants who are in the business of supplying information.2 ' One of the more influential appellate decisions is Black,
Jackson and Simmons Insurance v. International Business Ma22
chines Corporation.
In Black, the plaintiffs brought an action for
negligent misrepresentation, alleging that the defendants induced
them to buy computer equipment that failed to perform as expected. The court ruled that, according to Moorman, a plaintiff can
only recover economic damages under a theory of negligent misrepresentation if the defendants are in the business of supplying information.2 3 It concluded that defendants who supply computer equipment are not in the business of supplying information; therefore, the
plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action for negligent misrep18. Id. at 90, 435 N.E.2d at 453. The court ruled that a plaintiff's cause of action for economic loss due to a defective product lies in contract. Id. at 81, 435
N.E.2d at 450. On the other hand, the court held that a tort theory is suited for a
plaintiff who has suffered physical injury or property damage. Id. The Moorman
court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were only for economic losses, and, therefore, not recoverable in tort. Id. at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 451.
19. Id. at 88-91, 435 N.E.2d at 452-53. The court stated that allowing a plaintiff
to recover for economic loss under theories of strict liability, negligence, or innocent
misrepresentation would cause a manufacturer to become a guarantor that its product would perform satisfactorily throughout its reasonably productive life. Id. at 91,
435 N.E.2d at 453. The court declared that such a finding would encroach on the
legislature's decision to enact the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which
deal with economic loss. Id.
20. Id. at 89, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
21. E.g., Tan v. Boyke, 156 Ill. App. 3d 49, 508 N.E.2d 390 (1987) (no cause of
action against owner-seller of property because not in the business of supplying information), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1987); Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, 142 Ill. App. 3d 703, 491 N.E.2d 795 (1986) (negligent misrepresentation defendant must be in the business of supplying information); Richmond v. Blair, 142 Ill.
App. 3d 251, 488 N.E.2d 563 (1985) (cause of action against real estate broker because
in the business of supplying information); Grass v. Homan, 130 Ill. App. 3d 874, 474
N.E.2d 711 (1984) (negligent misrepresentation defendant must be in the business of
supplying information). See supra note 6 for additional negligent misrepresentation
cases holding that defendants must be in the business of supplying information.
22. 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282 (1982). See POLLELE & OTrLEY, ILLINOIS
TORT LAW 266 (1985) (Black decision has had considerable influence among the Illinois courts).
23. Black, 109 Ill.
App. 3d at 134, 440 N.E.2d at 282, 283.
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resentation2 ' Appellate courts quickly adopted the Black court's
reasoning.25
The appellate courts have routinely considered certain defendants to be in the business of supplying information but have not
established a standard to determine what other defendants are included. Since Moorman, appellate courts have held that in addition
to realtors, securities brokers, accountants, and an art importer2 6 are
in the business of supplying information. On the other hand, the
appellate court has also held, subsequent to Moorman, that a corporation managing a venture, private home sellers, a manufacturer and
seller of roofing materials, and sellers of a computer and software
package27 are all not in the business of supplying information.
Whether other service-providers, such as banks that give financial
and business advice, are in the business of supplying information
remains an open question.2"
THE PROPER SCOPE OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IN ILLINOIS

The Illinois Appellate Court's reliance on the Moorman dicta to
limit the scope of negligent misrepresentation is unjustifiable. The
Moorman court simply stated, in dicta, that "[tihis court has held
that economic loss is recoverable where ... one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions makes negligent representations . . . .9 The
court was merely expressing that, in Rozny, it allowed the recovery
of economic losses against a defendant who happened to be in the
business of supplying information. The Moorman court did not say
that the' tort was limited to that type of defendant and the supreme
24. Id. at 136, 440 N.E.2d at 284.
25. The following court decisions cited Black in holding that defendants have to
be in the business of supplying information: Century, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 510
N.E.2d at 1274; Richmond, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 488 N.E.2d at 567; Anderson Electric, Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corporation, 133 Ill. App. 3d 844, 850, 479 N.E.2d 476,
480 (1985), a/f'd, 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246 (1986); Brumley v. Touche Ross &
Co., 123 Ill. App.3d 636, 463 N.E.2d 195 (1984); Knox, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 308, 453
N.E.2d at 11. Additionally, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in
deciding negligent misrepresentation suits, has followed the Black decision and similar state appellate court rulings. Hi-Grade Cleaners, Inc. v. American Permac, Inc.,
561 F. Supp. 643, 644 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
26. Duchossois Indus., Inc. v. Stelloh, No. 87-C-4132, slip. op. at 18 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
27. Century, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 510 N.E.2d at 1260 (venture manager);
Tan, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 49, 508 N.E.2d at 390 (private home seller); Knox, 117 IIl.
App. 3d at 304, 453 N.E.2d at 8 (vendor of roofing materials); Black, 109 Ill. App. 3d
at 132, 440 N.E.2d at 282 (seller of computer system); see supra note 6 for additional
cases.
28. See Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, 142 Ill.
App. 3d 703, 711, 491
N.E.2d 795, 802-03 (1986) (suggests that bank which assists in financial planning
might be in the business of supplying information).
29. Moorman, 91 Ill.
2d at 85, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
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court did not intend to analyze the scope of negligent misrepresentation."0 Appellate court judges therefore should not have relied on
the Moorman court's reference to negligent misrepresentation as
limiting the scope of the tort."1
In developing the tort of negligent misrepresentation, Illinois
courts have consistently cited the Restatement of Torts. 2 However,
Restatement section 552, which recognizes a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, has been changed significantly. The original version of Section 552 stated that one who negligently supplies
false information in the course of his business or profession for the
guidance of others in their business transactions can be liable for
negligent misrepresentation."3 The Illinois Appellate Court, in Penrod v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, interpreted this to
mean that only those whose business it was to supply information
could be liable. " In the Second Restatement of Torts, published in
1977, Section 552 was substantially modified. The drafters expanded
the language of Section 552 to include a cause of action against one
who negligently supplies false information in any transaction in
5
which he has a pecuniary interest."
The Restatement Second version of Section 552 thus differs from the original version in that it
provides that a person who is not in the business of supplying information can be liable for economic damages by making negligent misrepresentations in, for example, a contractual relationship or other
30. See id. The court had no reason to discuss or analyze the scope of negligent
misrepresentation because its reference to the tort was mere dicta. Id.
31. The Illinois Supreme Court also made a passing reference to the tort of
negligent misrepresentation in 1986. In Anderson Electric, Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection
Corp., 115 Ill.2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246 (1986), the supreme court squarely refused to
decide whether recovery for negligent misrepresentation is limited to defendants in
the business of supplying information. Id. The court specifically held that it need not
address the issue because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants (electrical
contractor and manufacturer of electrical devices) made any negligent misrepresentations. Id. at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 249.
32. See, e.g., Black, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 132, 440 N.E.2d at 282; Penrod, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 75, 385 N.E.2d at 376; Citizens, 67 Ill. App. 2d at 315, 214 N.E.2d at 612;
Guaranty Bank, 51 Ill. App. 2d at 412, 201 N.E.2d at 144.
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (1938).
34. Penrod, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 82, 385 N.E.2d at 381.
35. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) with RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 552 (1938) (differences between the two versions of Section 552). For a
disucssion on Section 552 of the Restatement Second see Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationIn Missouri: Tooling Up for the Tort of the Eighties, 50 Mo. L. REv.
877, 888 (1985) [hereinafter Tort of the Eighties].
New Section 552 now provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transactionin which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1) (1977) (emphasis added).
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transaction in which he stands to make money.3
The Illinois Appellate Court has embraced both the older and
newer versions of Section 552, but has generally failed to recognize
that the newer version permits actions against defendants whether
or not they are in the business of supplying information. In Penrod,
the court held that under the original version of Section 552, a person can be liable for economic damages caused by his negligent misrepresentation only if he is in the business of supplying information."7 The court in Black adopted the same interpretation of
Section 552, but prefaced its references to Penrod by citing Section
552 of the Second Restatement. 8 The Black decision thus contains
a material inconsistency. The court recognized Section 552 of the
Restatement Second as controlling, but then interpreted it according to the language of Section 552 in the original Restatement. The
Black court failed to recognize that under Section 552 of the Second
Restatement, one can be held liable for negligently supplying information not only in the course of his business, profession or employment, but also "in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest."3 9 It is apparent therefore that by improperly interpreting
the current version of Section 552, the Black court incorrectly analyzed the scope of negligent misrepresentation in Illinois.
The treatment of negligent misrepresentation in other states
further indicates how the majority of Illinois appellate court decisions have wrongly limited the scope of the tort. Decisions from
other states persuasively suggest that Illinois courts should not interpret Rozny and Moorman to limit negligent misrepresentation
actions to those defendants who are in the business of supplying information. Courts in at least nine states have applied Section 552 of
the Restatement to permit a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against defendants not in the business of supplying
information.40
36.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 552 (1977); Dousson v. South Cent. Bell,

429 So.2d 466, 468 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (telephone company liable for negligent misrepresentation due to failure to provide a certain phone number).
37. Penrod, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 385 N.E.2d at 381.
38. Black, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 440 N.E.2d at 284.
39. For a discussion of § 552 of the Second Restatement, see infra note 35.
40. See, e.g., Robinson v. Doudre Valley Federal Credit Union, 654 P.2d 861,
863 (Colo. 1982); Eby v. York-Division, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); Dousson v. South Cent. Bell, 429 So.2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Chubb Group
of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 766, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
State Bank of Townsend v. MaryAnn's, Inc., 204 Mont. 21, 664 P.2d 295 (1983); Bank
of Nevada v. Butler Aviation - O'Hare, Inc. 96 Nev. 763, 616 P.2d 398 (1980); Mathis
v. Yondata Corp., 125 Misc. 2d 383, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1984); Merriman v. Smith,
599 S.W.2d 548, 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil Corp.,
574 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
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For example, in Mathis v. Yondata Corp.,"' a New York court
cited Section 552 of the Restatement Second in holding a supplier of
computer systems liable for a negligent misrepresentation claim. "
On essentially the same facts as Black, the Mathis court reached the
opposite result by correctly interpreting Section 552 of the Second
Restatement. Consistent with those decisions in other states, the Illinois Supreme Court in Rozny and Moorman, did not intend to exclude plaintiffs from suing these types of defendants under the theory of negligent misrepresentation.
The Illinois Appellate Court, in A, C, & S, therefore properly
ruled that in claims for economic damages, the application of negligent misrepresentation is not limited to defendants who are in the
business of supplying information. Other Illinois courts should follow the A, C, & S court's lead and broaden the scope of this tort.
Courts unduly limiting the application of negligent misrepresentation are in error because the Illinois Supreme Court never intended
to so limit the tort. In addition, the more limited rule of Black is
difficult to apply because there is no clear standard for determining
whether a particular defendant is in the business of supplying information. Illinois courts should therefore join those states which have
adopted the proper interpretation of Section 552 of the Second Restatement of Torts. The availability of negligent misrepresentation
as a cause of action would then be clear: liability could attach to any
person who negligently supplies information to others in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest.
Robert A. Borich, Jr.

41.
42.

125 Misc. 2d 383, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1984).
Id. at 385, 480 N.Y.S. 2d at 177.

